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The Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA)1 was aimed at ensuring that 
all citizens, and in particular African Americans, have equal 
opportunity to participate in the political process. Initial enforcement 
focused on eliminating tools of Black disenfranchisement that had 
developed over the previous century: grandfather clauses, literacy 
tests, poll taxes, and discriminatory administration of “understanding 
clause” rules that disenfranchised literate Blacks. In 1970, provisions 
were added to the VRA to protect against Black vote dilution, 
whereby individuals were physically allowed to vote but those votes 
were manipulated so as to deny Blacks a meaningful voice.2 Although 
not specifically mentioned in the VRA, majority-minority districts 
have often been used to satisfy the law’s mandate to ensure that all 
citizens are able “to elect representatives of their choice.”3 Majority-
minority districts are those where a majority of residents are members 
of a historically underrepresented group, such as Blacks or Latinos. 
Scholars have consistently found that these majority-minority districts 
increase Black representation in Congress as well as in state and local 
legislatures,4 and that these districts further benefit African 
Americans by contributing to increased trust in government and 
increased civic engagement.5 African Americans continue to rely on 
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 1. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1973–1973bb (West 2010). 
 2. See generally DAVID MICHAEL HUDSON, ALONG RACIAL LINES: CONSEQUENCES OF 
THE 1965 VOTING RIGHTS ACT (1998) (documenting the history of the VRA). 
 3. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973(b). 
 4. Charles Cameron, David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, Do Majority-Minority Districts 
Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress? 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 794–812 (1996); 
David Lublin, Racial Redistricting and African-American Representation: A Critique of ‘Do 
Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?’ 93 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV.183, 183–86 (1999); Susan Welch, The Impact of At-Large Elections on the 
Representation of Blacks and Hispanics, 52 J. POL., 1050, 1056–65 (1990). 
 5. See, e.g., Lawrence Bobo & Franklin D. Gilliam, Jr., Race, Sociopolitical Participation, 
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majority-minority districts for their electoral success and equitable 
representation, particularly in the South. 
The VRA has also been used to ensure that Latinos are 
adequately represented. Although some aspects of the original 
VRA—Section 4(e), for example—were meant to benefit Puerto 
Ricans in New York, its relevance for Latinos increased markedly 
with the 1975 extension to cover language minorities.6 Results from 
the 1980 Census were used to create majority-Latino districts that 
later led to increased Latino representation, often including areas 
where lines had previously been drawn so as to dilute Latino vote 
strength.7 Particularly during the post-1990 Census round of 
redistricting, lines were drawn to maximize the election of both Black 
and Latino members of Congress. As a consequence, most Latino 
members of Congress today owe their seats to the creation of 
majority-Latino districts. As is the case for African Americans, the 
Latino community has reaped benefits from majority-Latino districts 
beyond descriptive representation, including increased substantive 
representation, increased civic engagement, and increased feelings of 
political trust and efficacy.8 
Discussions about the current and continued value of these 
districts are complicated by the fact that most analyses do not 
distinguish between Black and Latino majority-minority districts and 
populations. Those who argue that majority-minority districts are 
crucial for the election of Black and Latino representatives make 
several assumptions: 1) racial polarization remains strong enough to 
otherwise deny Blacks and Latinos the opportunity to elect 
candidates of their choice; 2) Blacks and Latinos are monolithic 
groups that vote as a bloc; and 3) there is value in having elected 
officials who descriptively represent their constituents. In other words, 
both communities are often lumped together as treated as “minority” 
 
and Black Empowerment, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 377, 383-84, 387–88 (1990) (concluding 
political empowerment of blacks leads to increased civic engagement, trust, and political 
efficacy). 
 6. Juan Cartagena, Latinos and Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: Beyond Black and 
White, 18 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 201, 204–05, 211–15 (2004). 
 7. Luis Ricardo Fraga, Prototype from the Midwest: Latinos in Illinois, in FROM 
RHETORIC TO REALITY: LATINO POLITICS IN THE 1988 ELECTIONS 111, 117–25 (Rodolfo O. de 
la Garza & Louis DeSipio eds., 1992). 
 8. Matt A. Barreto, Gary M. Segura & Nathan D. Woods, The Mobilizing Effect of 
Majority-Minority Districts on Latino Turnout, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 65, 74 (2004); Adrian D. 
Pantoja & Gary M. Segura, Does Ethnicity Matter? Descriptive Representation in Legislatures 
and Political Alienation Among Latinos, 84 SOC. SCI. Q. 441, 443–44, 455–57 (2003). 
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voters and many observers fail to note the distinctive political 
contexts and realities of each. In fact, the level of racial polarization 
against Black and Latino candidates differs, and the two groups 
display dissimilar levels of political unity. In addition, Black and 
Latino communities have unique demographic and geographic 
histories. Thus, any discussion of the future of majority-minority 
districts must analyze separately how best to ensure compliance with 
the VRA and the full extension of rights of citizenship to Blacks and 
Latinos. This article examines the history and political realities of 
Latinos in the United States, including their experiences with 
majority-Latino districts, and concludes that the Latino community 
continues to need these districts for reasons distinct from those of the 
Black community. 
LATINOS AND THE VRA 
Two sections of the VRA, combined with subsequent judicial 
interpretations and amendments, have led to the creation and 
proliferation of majority-minority districts. Section 2 prohibits policies 
or practices that give minorities “less opportunity than other 
members of the electorate to participate in the political process and 
to elect representatives of their choice,” and applies to the entire 
country.9 Section 5 requires state and local jurisdictions with a history 
of discrimination to acquire federal preclearance for changes to their 
voting laws and practices in order to confirm that any proposed 
changes do “not have the purpose and will not have the effect of 
denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color” or 
membership in a language minority group.10 In 1969, the Supreme 
Court interpreted the VRA to also protect against the dilution of 
minority votes.11 Additionally, the 1970 reauthorization of a ban on 
literacy tests led in 1975 to the extension of the VRA to cover 
language minorities, as Congress determined that failing to provide 
in-language materials to citizens not proficient in English constituted 
illegal literacy tests.12 
Interpretation of section 5 was significantly changed by the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Georgia v. Ashcroft.13 Writing for the 
 
 9. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973(b) (West 2010). 
 10. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973(c). 
 11. Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969). 
 12. HUDSON, supra note 2, at 109–11. 
 13. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003). 
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majority, Justice O’Connor expanded the definition of the right of 
voters to “elect representatives of their choice” to include both 
districts where it is “highly likely” that this right will be protected as 
well as districts where it is “perhaps not quite as likely.”14 As Alvaro 
Bedoya notes, 
After Georgia v. Ashcroft covered jurisdictions could secure 
preclearance even if they had “unpacked” majority-minority 
districts to create “coalitional districts,” where minority groups 
depend on coalitions with other voters to elect their candidates of 
choice, or “influence districts,” where minority voters are not able 
to elect their candidates of choice, but could be swing voters in an 
election. Prior to Georgia v. Ashcroft, preclearance for those 
jurisdictions would have been highly unlikely.15 
In reaching this decision, Georgia v. Ashcroft cited five political 
science studies that showed both decreased racial polarization and 
that influence and coalitional districts were the best way to maximize 
minority voting strength.16 Yet, all five studies noted by Georgia v. 
Ashcroft focused on Black voting power.17 
Conclusions based on studies of Black political power do not 
necessarily speak to the political realities of other communities. 
Blacks and Latinos are both historically underrepresented minority 
groups in the United States and share a history of racism and 
discrimination, but a number of questions should be considered 
before assuming that they benefit equally from majority-minority 
districts. Are the political realities faced by Latinos similar to those 
faced by Blacks?18 How willing are White voters to vote for Latino 
candidates? Are Latinos a cohesive voting bloc, or are they divided 
along partisan lines? To what degree are Latinos currently able to 
 
 14. Id. at 480. 
 15. Alvaro Bedoya, Note, The Unforeseen Effects of Georgia v. Ashcroft on the Latino 
Community, 115 YALE L.J. 2112, 2116–17 (2006) (footnote omitted). 
 16. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 482–83. 
 17. CAROL M. SWAIN, BLACK FACES, BLACK INTERESTS: THE REPRESENTATION OF 
AFRICAN-AMERICANS IN CONGRESS 193–234 (1995); Cameron et al., supra note 4, at 808; 
Bernard Grofman, Lisa Handley & David Lublin, Drawing Effective Minority Districts: A 
Conceptual Framework and Some Empirical Evidence, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1383 (2001); Lublin, 
supra note 4, at 185 ; Richard H. Pildes, Is Voting-Rights Law Now at War With Itself? Social 
Science and Voting Rights in the 2000s, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1517, 1517 (2002). 
 18. This discussion generally follows previous research in considering Black and Latino 
politics as distinct; however, as noted by Tony Affigne, there has always been an Afro-Latino 
component to the Latino community, particularly in the Northeast, and their presence is 
increasing due to patterns of internal migration and increased immigration from nations with 
large African-descent populations such as the Dominican Republic, Colombia, and Ecuador. 
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elect Latino representatives, and how are they limited in this ability 
due to low turnout? Can Latinos elect a Latino candidate in a district 
where they do not constitute a majority or supermajority of the 
population, or are majority-minority districts key to the continued 
protection and growth of Latino political power? The following 
sections of this article address these questions in order to better 
understand the continuing role of majority-minority districts in 
providing equal opportunity to Latinos in the United States. 
RACIAL POLARIZATION 
Notwithstanding Barack Obama’s historic victories in the 
majority-White Democratic Party caucus in Iowa and the general 
election of November 2008, there is considerable evidence that racial 
animosity towards Black candidates by White voters persists to this 
day, particularly in the South.19 Latino candidates, however, have a 
very different relationship with White voters. Their presence does not 
provoke the same “racial threat” response among Whites as does the 
presence of African Americans.20 According to Luis Fraga and 
Ricardo Ramírez, in the California State Assembly elections of 1992, 
1994, 1996 and 1998, Latinos were elected in every district where 
Latinos were at least 40% of the electorate.21 Expanding this research 
with a national dataset and updated election results, Jason Casellas 
finds that “it takes more African Americans in a district to increase 
the probability of electing African American legislators than it does 
for Latinos.”22 
The research in this area is limited, yet several studies find that 
White voters are generally willing to vote for Latino candidates. As 
noted by Marylee Taylor in her examination of the 1990 General 
 
 19. Michael S. Lewis-Beck, Charles Tien & Richard Nadeau, Obama’s Missed Landslide: A 
Racial Cost? 43 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 69, 72–75 (2010); D. Stephen Voss & David Lublin, Black 
Incumbents, White Districts: An Appraisal of the 1996 Congressional Elections, 29 AM. POL. RES. 
141, 172–74 (2001). 
 20. See J. Eric Oliver & Janelle Wong, Intergroup Prejudice in Multiethnic Settings, 47 AM. 
J. OF POL. SCI. 567, 568–69, 579–81 (2003) (reviewing ethnic populations’ attitudes towards 
other ethnic populations); Marylee C. Taylor, How White Attitudes Vary with the Racial 
Composition of Local Populations: Numbers Count, 63 AM. SOC. REV., 512, 531–33 (1998) 
(examining white attitudes towards minority populations). 
 21. Luis Fraga & Ricardo Ramírez, Continuity and Change: Latino Political Incorporation 
in California Since 1990, in 3 RACIAL AND ETHNIC POLITICS IN CALIFORNIA (Bruce Cain & 
Sandra Bass eds., 2008). 
 22. Jason Casellas, Coalitions in the House? The Election of Minorities to State Legislatures 
and Congress, 62 POL. RES. Q. 1, 6  (2008). 
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Social Survey, where she finds much less racial animosity among 
Whites towards Latinos than towards Blacks, those who lump 
minority groups together should be sensitive to the “unique position 
of blacks in U.S. society.”23 Exploiting a natural experiment in the 2001 
municipal elections in Los Angeles, Marisa Abrajano, Jonathan 
Nagler and R. Michael Alvarez find that White (and Latino) voters 
used issues and ideology, and not just ethnic identity, to make vote 
choices between White and Latino candidates.24 
Casellas looks at the election of Latinos to the California state 
legislature both before and after the post-2000 Census round of 
redistricting.25 In 1990, Latinos constituted 25% of the state’s 
population but held only 5% of seats in the state Assembly and 
Senate. Just ten years later, Latino representation had grown to more 
than 20% of the state legislature, while their share of the population 
had grown to about a third. More interesting are the conclusions that 
can be reached by closer examination of just which seats are held by 
Latinos, and the degree to which these reflect the creation of 
majority-Latino districts. Before the poast-2000 Census round of 
redistricting, Latinos held twenty-five seats in the California state 
legislature but only three of those seats belonged to majority-Latino 
districts. After the redistricting, the total number of Latino legislators 
grew to twenty-nine, but now twenty were from majority-Latino 
districts. Casellas notes: “Latino candidates are more likely to run in 
districts with higher percentages of Latinos because their chances of 
winning increase.”26 Still, he concludes that while Latinos are most 
likely to win in majority-Latino districts, they are also increasingly 
viable candidates in non-majority Latino districts. While African 
Americans in California continue to have difficulty winning in mixed-
race districts, Latinos in mixed Latino-White districts often form 
coalitions with White voters to elect Latino representatives, 
paralleling multi-city findings from research several decades ago by 
Rufus Browning, Dale Marshall and David Tabb.27 
 
 23. Taylor, supra note 20, at 531. 
 24. Marisa A. Abrajano, Jonathan Nagler & R. Michael Alvarez, A Natural Experiment of 
Race-Based and Issue Voting: The 2001 City of Los Angeles Elections, 58 POL. RES. Q. 203, 215–
16 (2005). 
 25. Jason P. Casellas, The Elections of Latinos to the California Legislature Pre- and Post-
2000 Redistricting, 11 CAL. POL. & POL’Y 21–37 (2007). 
 26. Id. at 23. 
 27. RUFUS P. BROWNING, DALE R. MARSHALL & DAVID H. TABB, PROTEST IS NOT 
ENOUGH: THE STRUGGLE OF BLACKS AND HISPANICS FOR EQUALITY IN URBAN POLITICS 17–
135 (1984). 
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In subsequent research expanding his scope to include other 
states, Casellas finds that Latinos are better able to win election in 
states with citizen legislators and legislatures with high turnover 
rates.28 Examining data from 1992 to 2004, including state legislatures 
and Congress, he finds that while “percentage Latino” is a strong 
predictor of the election of a Latino candidate, institutions with low 
levels of turnover (e.g. high incumbency rates) are less likely to elect 
Latinos. In other words, because of California’s high turnover rates 
(due in part to strict term limits), there are increased opportunities for 
Latinos to win elections even when they do not constitute a majority 
of a particular district.29 Casellas notes that 
when Latinos are represented in large numbers in a state 
legislature, even white voters become more willing to support 
Latino candidates for statewide offices. For example, Bill 
Richardson (D-NM) was elected governor in a state with a large 
Latino population (43%) precisely because of his ability to appeal 
to both Latino and white voters in the state.30 
One complication to studies evaluating the ability of Latinos to 
win in mixed race/ethnicity districts is the issue of self-selection. The 
tendency for Latinos to represent majority-Latino districts may be a 
reflection of their lack of competitiveness in majority-White districts, 
or it may be a reflection of the lack of attempts to win election in 
majority-White districts. How can we accurately measure the ability 
of Latinos to win votes from non-Latino neighborhoods if they don’t 
usually even try? Casellas finds that when Latinos try to win in these 
districts, they are less successful than Latino candidates in majority-
Latino districts but still often win elections. This parallels studies of 
gender in politics, in that women are less likely to win elected office 
but also less likely to compete; thus, the underrepresentation of 
women in elected office reflects a combination of the reluctance of 
voters to support women but also the absence of women on the 
 
 28. Jason P. Casellas, The Institutional and Demographic Determinants of Latino 
Representation, 34 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 399, 418 (2009). 
 29. Id. See also Susan J. Carroll & Krista Jenkins, Increasing Diversity or More of the 
Same? Term Limits and the Representation of Minorities, Women, and Minority Women in State 
Legislatures, 10 NAT’L POL. SCI. REV. 71, 81–82 (2005). Carroll and Jenkins note that the 
pattern is very different for African Americans and Latinos, in that African Americans are 
better able to capture seats in majority-Black districts once long-term White incumbents are 
termed out, while for Latinos the open seats created via term limits allow them to also win seats 
in majority-White districts where Latinos may constitute only a small minority of the 
population. 
 30. Casellas, supra note 28, at 404. 
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ballot.31 More Latinos would be elected if they were more often 
recruited and supported by political parties and interest groups.32 
The relative lack of racial animosity towards Latinos should not 
be overstated; considerable discrimination against Latinos and 
attempts to limit Latino voting power persist to this day. As recently 
as 2006, intervention by the Supreme Court was needed to prevent 
Texas elected officials from unconstitutionally diluting Latino vote 
strength.33 Until the 1950s, there were virtually no Latino elected 
officials in the United States. The Voting Rights Act of 1965, the 1975 
extension to language minorities, and subsequent litigation to protect 
those rights by Latino civil rights organizations have been crucial to 
the expansion of Latino political power and representation. While 
thousands of Latinos have since won elected office, the number of 
Latino elected officials today is still “woefully discrepant” with the 
size of the population.34 At 15.4% of the population (as of 2008), 
Latinos would need to hold sixty-seven seats in the U.S. House of 
Representatives to achieve proportional representation. They 
currently hold twenty-five, most of which are in districts where 
Latinos are at least 50% of the population, as shown in Table 1. In 
contrast, Blacks are 12.1% of the population and hold forty-two seats 
(10%) in the House.35 
 
 31. Richard L. Fox & Jennifer L. Lawless, Entering the Arena? Gender and the Decision to 
Run for Office, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 264, 274–75 (2004); Jennifer L. Lawless & Richard L. Fox, If 
Only They’d Ask: Gender, Recruitment, and Political Ambition, 72 J. POL. (forthcoming 2010); 
Jennifer L. Lawless & Kathryn Pearson, The Primary Reason for Women's 
Underrepresentation? Reevaluating the Conventional Wisdom, 70 J. POL. 67, 76–78 (2008). 
 32. See Henry E. Brady, Kay Lehman Schlozman & Sidney Verba, Prospecting for 
Participants: Rational Expectations and the Recruitment of Political Activists, 93 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 153 (1999) (noting that recruitment of candidates is often biased so that the people 
recruited have traits similar to the recruiters); Gary F. Moncrief, Recruitment and Retention in 
U. S. Legislatures, 24 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 173, 174–84 (1999) (surveying studies that show the 
importance of recruiting candidates). 
 33. League of United Latin Am. Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006); see also 
Ellen D. Katz, Reviving the Right to Vote, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1163, 1163 (2007) (arguing that “the 
application of distinct doctrines to invalidate or diminish what are indisputably partisan 
gerrymanders . . . may well have salutary effects”). 
 34. KIM GERON, LATINO POLITICAL POWER 7 (2005). 
 35. Three hundred thirty-two members are White (76%) and five are Asian (1%). 
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Table 1  
Latino Members of the 111th U.S. House of Representatives36 
 Representative District % Latino   Representative District % Latino 
 John Salazar CO-3 22.5   Mario Diaz-Balart FL-25 67.9 
 Lucille Roybal-Allard CA-34 36.1   Loretta Sanchez CA-47 68.7 
 Ben Ray Luján NM-3 38.2   Xavier Becerra CA-31 69.0 
 Nydia Velázquez NY-12 46.2   Charles Gonzalez TX-20 69.8 
 Devin Nunes CA-21 48.5   Solomon Ortiz TX-27 71.6 
 Albio Sires NJ-13 49.3   Luis Gutierrez IL-4 72.4 
 Dennis Cardoza CA-18 50.1   Lincoln Diaz-Balart FL-21 73.5 
 Raúl Grijalva AZ-7 54.6   Grace F. Napolitano CA-38 75.2 
 Ileana Ros-Lehtinen FL-18 64.8   Henry Cuellar TX-28 78.8 
 Linda Sanchez CA-39 65.0   Rubén Hinojosa TX-15 79.8 
 Ciro Rodriguez TX-23 65.5   Joe Baca CA-43 80.2 
 Ed Pastor AZ-4 66.3   Silvestre Reyes TX-16 80.9 
 José Serrano NY-16 66.4  
   
 
Of the twenty-five House seats currently held by Latinos, over 
half are in California (eight) and Texas (six). This parallels the 
geographic concentration of Latinos in those states, but also illustrates 
the difficulties faced by Latino candidates who may choose to run in 
districts where there is not a majority-Latino population. Of the 
twenty-five current Latino House members, only six represent non-
majority-Latino districts. 
Even in California, racial polarization in voting persists; “the 
legacy of prejudice and discrimination against Latinos still hangs 
heavy over the political process.”37 Scholars looking at elections in Los 
Angeles County from 1998 to 2003 find persistent evidence of racially 
polarized voting against Latino candidates by White voters, and 
 
 36. This data was compiled from the United States House of Representatives and U.S. 
Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2006-2008, available at 
http://www.census.gov/acs/www/. Florida Representatives are Republicans; others are 
Democrats. 
 37. GERON, supra note 34, at 206. 
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racially cohesive bloc voting in favor of those candidates by Latino 
voters.38 Thus, while White animosity towards Latino candidates may 
be less than White animosity towards Black candidates, it is still 
widespread, with consequences for Latino candidates and Latino 
voting rights. Until White animosity towards Latinos is dramatically 
reduced, equal political rights for Latinos may be achievable only 
through continued use of majority-Latino districts. 
THE LACK OF LATINO POLITICAL COHESIVENESS 
Another crucial factor in the majority-minority district debate is 
the degree to which Black or Latino voters constitute a cohesive 
political group. Numerous studies have shown that Blacks are 
motivated by feelings of racial linked fate and that they are a 
relatively monolithic political group, regularly giving 80% or more of 
their support to the Democratic Party.39 Latinos, however, are less 
unified. A 2000 survey of Latino likely voters found that 56.6% 
identified as Democrats, 24.5% identified as Republicans, and 13% 
identified as independent. 40 Data from the 2006 Latino National 
Survey shows that Latino citizens identify as Democrats as compared 
to Republicans by a ratio of 2.6 to 1, but there are significant 
variations by national origin and location. Mexican Americans prefer 
the Democratic Party by a ratio of 2.9 to 1, Puerto Ricans prefer the 
Democratic Party by 3.2 to 1, and Cuban Americans prefer the 
Republican Party by a ratio of 1.5 to 1.41 To speak of Latinos as a 
cohesive voting bloc is therefore somewhat misleading; yet, the clear 
trend is a preference for the Democratic Party. Cubans are the 
exception, but they represent only 3.5% of the Latino population. 
As the Cuban-descent population in the United States ages and 
becomes less prominent—Cubans are about to be replaced by 
Dominicans as the third-largest Latino national-origin subgroup 
 
 38. Yishaiya Abosch, Matt A. Barreto & Nathan D. Woods, An Assessment of Racially 
Polarized Voting For and Against Latino Candidates, in VOTING RIGHTS ACT 
REAUTHORIZATION OF 2006: PERSPECTIVES ON DEMOCRACY, PARTICIPATION, AND POWER 
107, 127–29 (Ana Henderson ed., 2007). 
 39. MICHAEL C. DAWSON, BEHIND THE MULE: RACE AND CLASS IN AFRICAN-
AMERICAN POLITICS 77–88, 107 (1994); see generally PAUL FRYMER, UNEASY ALLIANCES 
(1999) (exploring the ramifications of the Democratic Party’s “capture” of black votes). 
 40. R. Michael Alvarez & Lisa García Bedolla, The Foundations of Latino Voter 
Partisanship: Evidence from the 2000 Election, 65 J. POL. 31, 31–49 (2003). 
 41. Luis Ricardo Fraga, et al., Patterns of Latino Partisanship: Foundations and the 
Prospects for Change, at 8, presented at the annual meeting of the Western Political Science 
Association (Mar. 19–21, 2009). 
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(after Mexicans and Puerto Ricans)—the cohesiveness of the Latino 
community will increase. While Cuban Americans as a whole continue 
to prefer the Republican Party, younger Cuban Americans (those not 
socialized by the Castro revolution) are more likely to prefer the 
Democratic Party. At the same time, increasing numbers of non-
Cuban Latinos in Florida, generally Puerto Ricans, are turning the 
state blue. In the November 2008 election, 57% of Latino voters in 
Florida preferred the Democratic nominee, a result driven by Puerto 
Ricans in central Florida. Overall, 67% of Latinos voted for Obama, 
compared to 31% for John McCain. Although this does not approach 
the 95% rate of support for Obama among Black voters, it is still a 
stronger Democratic tendency than exists among White voters, who 
were split 43% to 55% in favor of McCain.42 
Also important is the degree to which Latinos display ethnic 
cohesiveness, and how partisanship and ethnicity play into their vote 
choices. The tendency for Latino voters to prefer coethnic candidates 
is dependent on individual levels of ethnic identification and whether 
or not the candidates are copartisans.43 Spatial models of voting 
predict that voters will choose the candidate who is closest to them on 
issues and characteristics, but which arena is more salient to Latino 
voters: ethnicity or partisanship? The evidence here is mixed. To 
examine the pathways by which ethnicity influences vote choice, Scott 
Graves and Jongho Lee conducted a survey just before a 1996 U.S. 
Senate race in Texas between a Democratic Mexican American 
challenger and an Anglo Republican incumbent.44 They found that 
ethnicity plays a key role in vote choice, but it does so indirectly 
through partisanship, ethnic-related issue positions, and candidate 
evaluations. This suggests that partisanship is more important than 
ethnicity, a conclusion supported by a natural experiment from 
California’s 20th Congressional District in 2000, when an Anglo 
Democrat incumbent was challenged by a Mexican American 
Republican in a heavily Latino district (55%) in the Central Valley.45 
 
 42. Mark Hugo Lopez, How Hispanics Voted in the 2008 Election, Pew Research Center, 
Nov. 7, 2008, http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1024/exit-poll-analysis-hispanics; Julia Preston, In Big 
Shift, Latino Vote was Heavily for Obama, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2008, at A24, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/07/us/politics/07latino.html. 
 43. Victoria M. De Francesco Soto, Do Latinos Party All the Time? The Role of Shared 
Ethnic Group Identity on Political Choice (2007) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Duke 
University), available at http://hdl.handle.net/10161/191. 
 44. Scott Graves & Jongho Lee, Ethnic Underpinnings of Voting Preference: Latinos and 
the 1996 U.S. Senate Election in Texas, 81 SOC. SCI. Q. 226, 226–36 (2000). 
 45. Melissa R. Michelson, Does Ethnicity Trump Party? Competing Vote Cues and Latino 
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In this case, Latino voters chose to vote for their copartisan rather 
than for their coethnic. Not only did the incumbent, Cal Dooley, easily 
beat Richard Rodriguez in his bid for a sixth term, taking 52.4% of 
the vote to Rodriguez’s 45.5%, but a poll of Latino voters just before 
the election showed that 60% of respondents planned to vote for the 
Anglo Democrat. 
Other research indicates that ethnicity can be more important 
than partisanship. For example, the Dade County, Florida mayoral 
election of September 1996 included four major candidates: a Black 
Republican, a Puerto Rican Democrat, a Cuban American Democrat, 
and a Cuban American Independent.46 Over 80% of Black voters in 
the county were registered as Democrats, whereas over 60% of 
registered Latinos were Republicans. In other words, ethnicity and 
partisanship were not aligned; yet, ethnicity was an overwhelmingly 
more powerful predictor of vote choice than was partisanship. In a 
poll conducted a week before the election, 97.4% of Latino 
respondents supported one of the three Latino candidates and 82% of 
African American respondents supported Arthur Teele, the Black 
Republican, indicating a very strong correlation between 
race/ethnicity and vote choice.47 By contrast, there was little 
congruence between partisanship and vote choice: most Democrats 
supported the Republican, while 79% of Republicans supported one 
of the Democrats. Another example comes from a majority-Latino 
district in California. In 1982, Anglo Republican John Rousselot 
challenged the Latino Democrat incumbent, Marty Martinez, in 
California’s heavily Latino 30th Congressional District. Martinez won 
support from 86% of Latino Democrats, and won the race by a 
comfortable margin. Two-thirds of Latino Republicans crossed party 
lines to support their coethnic, even when voting for White 
Republicans in other races (for governor and U.S. Senate) that did not 
include Latino candidates.48 
In addition to the dominant influences of partisanship and 
ethnicity, other factors such as issue positions and symbolic cues also 
 
Voting Behavior, 4 J. POL. MARKETING 1, 1–25 (2005). 
 46. Kevin A. Hill, Dario V. Moreno & Lourdes Cue, Racial and Partisan Voting in a Tri-
Ethnic City: The 1996 Dade County Mayoral Election , 23 J. URB. AFF. 291, 297 (2001). 
 47. Id. at 302. 
 48. Bruce E. Cain & D. Roderick Kiewiet, Ethnicity and Electoral Choice: Mexican 
American Voting Behavior in the California 30th Congressional District, 65 SOC. SCI. Q. 315 
(1984). 
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play a role. The nonpartisan Los Angeles city elections of 2001 
included two competitive races for open seats in which one candidate 
in each race was Latino and one was Anglo.49 In the mayoral race, the 
Latino candidate (Antonio Villaraigosa) was more liberal than the 
White candidate (Jim Hahn). In the race for city attorney, the Latino 
candidate (Rocky Delgadillo) was more moderate than the White 
candidate (Mike Feuer). While 82% of Latinos voted for Villaraigosa 
and 79% for Delgadillo, only 66.2% voted for both Latino candidates. 
In other words, a third of Latino voters chose one Anglo candidate 
over a coethnic. Ethnicity was not solely responsible for vote choice; 
ideology, issues, evaluation of the L.A. economy, personal economic 
security, and education were also important determinants. 
Conservatives were more likely to choose Hahn and Delgadillo. More 
educated Latinos were more likely to vote for a White candidate.50 
Other research indicates that low-education Latinos are more 
likely than high-education Latinos to use non-policy cues when 
evaluating a candidate.51 For example, if a candidate speaks Spanish, is 
Latino, promises to appoint Latino officials, uses Spanish-language 
advertisements, or campaigns in Latino neighborhoods, then low-
income Latinos are more likely to evaluate the candidate favorably. 
High-education Latinos are more likely to use policy and ideology 
cues, as predicted by the classic spatial model. 
In sum, while Latinos prefer to vote for coethnic candidates, they 
do not constitute as cohesive a voting bloc as do African Americans, 
particularly when faced with competing vote cues of partisanship or 
issue positions. Yet, the tendency for Latinos to be willing to vote 
against a coethnic due to competing vote cues should not be 
overstated. Generally speaking, Latinos prefer to support Latino 
 
 49. Marisa A. Abrajano et al., A Natural Experiment of Race-Based and Issue Voting: The 
2001City of Los Angeles Elections, 58 POL. RES. Q. 203, 203 (2005). 
 50. Id. at 212–13. Cf. Matt A. Barreto et al., Metropolitan Latino Political Behavior: Voter 
Turnout and Candidate Preference in Los Angeles 27 J. URB. AFF. 71 (2005) (examining the 
2001 Los Angeles elections). Metropolitan Latino Political Behavior notes that several factors 
were present in the L.A. context that make ethnic-based voting more likely: enhanced Latino 
cohesiveness and politicization in the wake of a series of anti-immigrant and anti-Latino 
initiatives and rhetoric in the 1990s, the presence of a viable Latino candidate, and mobilization 
drives conducted by Latino organizations. Id. at 73–78. Registered Latinos voted at higher rates 
than non-Latinos and tended to support their coethnic (over 80% chose Villaraigosa). Id. at 76. 
In contrast to turnout in the November 2000 presidential election, turnout in 2001 was linked to 
the percentage of Latinos registered in a precinct. Id. at 83. In addition, precincts with higher 
percentages of Latinos greatly favored Villaraigosa. Id. at 85–86. 
 51. Marisa Abrajano, Who Evaluates a Presidential Candidate by Using Non-Policy 
Campaign Messages?, 58 POL. RES. Q. 55, 66 (2005). 
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candidates, particularly if they hold a panethnic identity or have 
feelings of Latino linked fate, both conditions that are increasingly the 
case. Most Latinos are of Mexican or Puerto Rican descent, with 
shared preferences for the Democratic Party and relatively consistent 
issue positions, and can form cohesive voting blocs in favor of 
Democratic Latino candidates. Cuban Americans, while distinctive in 
their preference for the Republican Party, are geographically 
concentrated in South Florida, and thus can form cohesive voting 
blocs for local Republican Latino candidates. In either context, Latino 
candidates running in majority-Latino districts can count on 
considerable support from Latino voters. 
THE LATINO ELECTORATE 
The size of the Latino electorate does not accurately reflect the 
size of the Latino population in the U.S. and is failing to keep pace 
with the community’s rapid growth. From 2000 to 2008, the size of the 
Latino population grew from 35.2 million to 46.8 million, increasing 
from 12.5% of the population to 15.4%.52 Unlike Black populations—
which are generally concentrated in the South, generally concentrated 
in segregated communities, and holding steady in comparison to non-
Black populations—Latino populations are moving in increasing 
numbers to “new destinations,” generally integrating into 
communities rather than creating new segregated communities, and 
growing quickly in comparison to other populations.53 Latinos are the 
fastest growing racial/ethnic group in the country, and are predicted 
by the U.S. Census to make up a third of the national population by 
2050.54 
Yet, Latinos only constituted 7% of the electorate in November 
2008, continuing a longstanding pattern of low voter turnout. 55 This is 
generally due to a variety of factors: lower levels of citizenship; lower 
 
 52. PEW HISPANIC CENTER, STATISTICAL PORTRAIT OF HISPANICS IN THE UNITED 
STATES, 2008 (2010) http://pewhispanic.org/factsheets/factsheet.php?FactsheetID=58. In 
comparison, Blacks grew from 12.0% of the population to 12.1%, while White non-Latinos 
shrank from 69.1% to 65.4%. Id. 
 53. John R. Logan, Brian J. Stults & Reynolds Farley, Segregation of Minorities in the 
Metropolis: Two Decades of Change, 41 DEMOGRAPHY 1, 1 (2004). 
 54. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, An Older and More Diverse Nation by Midcentury 
(Aug. 14, 2008), available at http://www.census.gov/Press-
Release/www/releases/archives/population/012496.html. 
 55. Douglas R. Hess & Jody Herman, Representational Bias in the 2009 Electorate, 
PROJECT VOTE REPORT, http://projectvote.org/reports-on-the-electorate-/440.html. In 
comparison, Blacks constituted 12% of the electorate in November 2008, Whites 76%. Id. 
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levels of English-language proficiency; and the demographic nature of 
the Latino community, including lower median levels of age, income, 
and education—all of which are strong predictors of turnout.56 Even 
among Latinos eligible to vote, participation lags behind that of 
Whites and Blacks. In other words, part of the reason Latinos are 
underrepresented is because they do not vote. Black citizens, in 
contrast, generally vote more than would be predicted by their 
socioeconomic characteristics and in levels approaching those of 
Whites. The historic 2008 Presidential election was unusual, in that 
Black turnout almost matched White turnout (65.2% and 66.1%, 
respectively),57 but even in previous elections Black turnout was much 
closer to White turnout than it was to Latino turnout. In 2006, 51.6% 
of White individuals of voting age claimed to have participated in the 
midterm elections, compared to 41% of Blacks and only 32.3% of 
Latinos.58 In 2004, 67.2% of Whites and 60% of Blacks reported 
voting, but only 47.2% of Latinos reported voting.59 And in contrast to 
the spike in Black turnout in November 2008, only 49.9% of Latino 
citizens made it to the polls (and only 31.6% of the voting-age 
population).60 In California, the population has shifted over the past 
three decades from 69% White to only 43% White, while the size of 
the Latino population has more than doubled from 18% to 37%. Yet, 
Whites are still 65% of the electorate, and Latinos only 21%.61 
Low Latino turnout is also due to asymmetries and deficiencies in 
mobilization and outreach by political parties and candidates, which 
have been found in multiple studies to be crucial to participation.62 
 
 56. LOUIS DESIPIO, COUNTING ON THE LATINO VOTE: LATINOS AS A NEW ELECTORATE  
(1996); Rodney E. Hero & Anne G. Campbell, Understanding Latino Political Participation: 
Exploring the Evidence from the Latino National Political Survey, 18 HISP. J. BEHAV. SCI. 129, 
129–32 (1996). 
 57. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Voter Turnout Increases by 5 Million in 2008 
Presidential Election, U.S. Census Bureau Reports: Data Shows Significant Increases Among 
Hispanic, Black, and Young Voters (July 20, 2009), available at http://www.census.gov/ 
hhes/www/socdemo/voting/publications/p20/2008/index.html. 
 58. U.S. Census Bureau, Voting and Registration in the Election of November 2006, June 
2008, http://www.census.gov/prod/2008pubs/p20-557.pdf. 
 59. U.S. Census Bureau, Voting and Registration in the Election of November 2004, March 
2006, http://www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/p20-556.pdf. 
 60. Voter Turnout Increases by 5 Million in 2008 Presidential Election, supra note 57. 
 61. Press Release, Field Research Corporation, The Changing California Electorate (Part 
1): Large-Scale Demographic Changes in California’s Electorate From What it Was Thirty 
Years Ago (Aug. 4, 2009), available at http://field.com/fieldpollonline/subscribers/Rls2309.pdf. 
 62. STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE & JOHN M. HANSEN, MOBILIZATION, PARTICIPATION, AND 
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 36–37 (1993); SIDNEY VERBA ET AL., VOICE AND EQUALITY: CIVIC 
VOLUNTARISM IN AMERICAN POLITICS, (1995); LATINOS IN THE 2008 ELECTION (Rodolfo O. 
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While non-partisan community organizations such as the National 
Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials and the 
Southwest Voter Registration Education Project expend considerable 
resources every election season to mobilize Latino voters, their efforts 
cannot compensate for the general lack of outreach by Democrats 
and Republicans, who tend to focus their efforts on likely voters. In 
July 2008, then-candidate Barack Obama made headlines with his 
pledge to spend $20 million to reach out to Latino voters. This was 
double what the GOP had spent on similar efforts in 2000, but less 
than 3% of the candidate’s overall campaign budget of $744.9 million. 
The bottom line is that despite the Latino community’s growing 
size and geographic scope, various demographic characteristics and 
chronic neglect by major party candidates and organizations combine 
to keep Latino turnout low. This limits the ability of Latinos to win 
elections in districts where they do not constitute a majority (or 
sometimes a supermajority) of the population, and severely limits 
their ability to “elect representatives of their choice” in coalitional or 
influence districts. The growth of the Latino share of the electorate 
continues to lag behind the growth of the Latino population. Until 
this disconnect between population size and share of the electorate 
changes, either as a result of partisan realignment or gradual 
population shifts, Latino representation will continue to rely heavily 
on the existence of majority-Latino districts. 
THE FUTURE OF THE MAJORITY-MINORITY DISTRICT 
Majority-minority districts are not without their own problems. 
Districts that are drawn to support the ability of a politically cohesive 
Latino (or Black) community should not be so safe as to allow an 
incumbent to serve without accountability. As noted by Ellen Katz, 
“the right to vote must encompass something more than the ability to 
cast a ballot for a preordained victor.”63 Yet, majority-minority 
districts remain important to the Latino community for several major 
reasons. The size and political participation of the Latino population 
is growing, but it still lags far behind that of Whites, and thus so does 
Latino representation. Latino political power is limited due to the 
community’s youth and large proportion of non-citizens, both of 
which contribute to low Latino voter turnout. A general lack of 
 
de la Garza et al.. eds., forthcoming 2010). 
 63. Katz, supra note 33, at 1166. 
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outreach by major political parties and organizations, including 
deficiencies in candidate recruitment and voter mobilization, further 
contribute to low Latino voter turnout. In addition, while racially 
polarized voting by Whites is less problematic for Latinos than for 
Blacks, it still exists, and is less compensated for by bloc voting in the 
Latino community because of the Latino community’s political and 
ideological diversity. Thus, even when Latinos constitute a majority or 
even a plurality of a district, their ability to elect a representative of 
their choice is limited. Given that representatives are expected to 
serve all members of their geographic constituencies and not just 
those with the franchise, majority-minority Latino districts remain 
crucial. In addition, descriptive representation of Latinos has 
numerous benefits to the community and to society as a whole, 
including increased substantive representation, trust in government, 
and participation. 
Georgia v. Ashcroft’s conclusion that coalition and influence 
districts are sufficient to ensure minority voting rights64 may be true 
for Blacks, but it is not true for Latinos. Support for proportional 
Latino representation thus requires the continued use of majority-
Latino districts and the protection of the right of Latino citizens to 
elect coethnic representatives, at least for the time being. In the 
“color-blind” future, majority-minority districts may no longer be 
necessary to guarantee equal representation and power to historically 
underrepresented groups in the United States, but we have not yet 
arrived at the end of the rainbow. 
 
 
 64. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 479–83 (2003). 
